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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Claimant Elf ego Marquez was injured on the job while working for an employer who was 
always aware of his status as an undocumented worker. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act 
expressly applies to any "person ... whether lawfully or unlmvfully employed ... " LC. § 72-
204(2). I\1r. Marquez's employer and its surety have conceded that J'vir. Marquez is a covered 
employee and accepted his claim under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, notwithstanding 
his status as an undocumented worker. As required by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, 
Mr. Marquez's employer and its surety have paid his medical bills, total temporary disability, 
and permanent partial impaim1ent. 
Despite having paid these benefits, Mr. Marquez's employer and surety are refusing to 
pay any permanent disability benefits because of his status as an undocumented worker. Mr. 
Marquez's employer and surety have taken this position in contravention of the express language 
of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act which provides permanent disability benefits to all 
Idaho employees whether lawfully or unlawfully employed. 
In its Order below, the Idaho Industrial Commission agreed that undocumented workers 
are entitled to pursue permanent disability benefits under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act 
without reference to immigration status. Mr. Marquez's employer and its surety have appealed 
this Order. 
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II. Statement of the Facts 
Mr. Marquez is a 47-year-old individual born and raised in Mexico. 1 Afier obtaining a 
teaching degree and teaching elementary age students in Mexico, Mr. Marquez's income was a 
paltry $300 per month.2 This was not enough to support his wife and daughter.3 
In or about 2000, Mr. Marquez left Mexico for the United States to look for better em-
ployment.4 Mr. Marquez was undocumented and did not enter the United States legally. 5 Mr. 
Marquez initially traveled to California, where he purchased a fake social security card and used 
it to obtain a job washing dishes and perfonning busboy duties at a restaurant.6 With his restau-
rant income, Mr. Marquez was able to have his wife and daughter join.him in the United States.7 
After working in California for approximately eight months, J\1r. Marquez moved to Emmett, 
Idaho, where he and his family have now resided for approximately eighteen years. 8 
After arriving in Idaho, Mr. Marquez obtained a job with Pierce Painting, Inc.9 Mr. 
Marquez told the owner of Pierce Painting, Rick Pierce, about his immigration status and about 
his status as an undocumented worker. 10 Mr. Pierce was aware that Mr. Marquez did not have a 
legal right to work in the United States and that the social security card used by Mr. Marquez 
1 Tr. p. 41, 11. 12-24. 
2 Tr. p. 42, 1. 13 top. 43, 1. 12; Tr. p. 44, 11. 3-10. 
3 Tr. p. 46, 11. 10-16. 
4 Id. 
5 R. atpp. 18-19 (StipulationofFacts). 
6 Tr. p. 46, 11. 17-23; Tr. p. 47, 11. 19-20; Tr. p. 48, 11. 5-10; Tr. p. 51, 11. 10-18. 
7 Tr. p. 51, 1. 10 top. 52, 1. 22. 
8 Id.; Tr. p. 68, 11. 5-11. 
9 Tr. p. 53, 11. 11-17. 
10 · Tr. p. 50, 1. 22 top. 51, 1. 5. 
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was fake. 11 Not long after beginning at Pierce Painting, Mr. Pierce received a garnishment notice 
associated with the fake social security number used by Mr. Marquez. 12 Mr. Pierce instructed 
Mr. Marquez to get a different fake social security number. 13 Mr. Marquez complied by purchas-
ing a different fake social security card and giving it to Mr. Pierce.14 
On May 20, 2010, while working for Pierce Painting, Mr. Marquez was in the process of 
preparing a house for painting. 15 His employer was in a hurry to have the house ready, but there 
was a shortage ofladders. 16 Mr. Marquez was told to do the best he could. 17 In order to reach an 
elevated area of the house, Mr. Marquez stacked two buckets on top of each other and was stand-
ing on these buckets working. 18 The buckets tipped, and he fell to the cement floor. 19 In the fall, 
he injured the shoulder and wrist of his dominant right arm.20 
Mr. Marquez was treated by Dr. Hassinger.21 Despite multiple surgeries on his right 
shoulder. Mr. Marquez has very limited use of his dominant right arm..22 He is totally unable to 
lift his right arm above his shoulder.23 Use of his right arm often requires that he hold his right 
11 Tr. p. 51, 11. 3-5. 
12 Tr. p. 49, 1. 12 top. 50, 1. 14. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Tr. p. 56, 1. 9 top. 58, 1. 3. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Tr. p. 58, 11. 4-25; Tr. p. 59, 11. 1-4. 
21 Tr. pp. 59-60. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
22 Tr. p. 60, 11. 23-25; Tr. p. 61, 11. 1-10. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
23 Tr. p. 62, 11. 4-13. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
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elbow against his side to stabilize the arm and allow some use of the lower arm.24 He is unable to 
perform the duties of his job with Pierce Painting.25 His ability to write with his dominant hand 
has been severely compromised.26 He experiences constant pain in his shoulder.27 This pain pre-
vents him from sleeping more than four hours at night. 28 Standing with his arm at his side for 
more than twenty minutes causes his pain to increase significantly.29 Washing dishes or sweep-
ing the floor for as little as a few minutes leaves him in pain.30 Even walking is difficult as he 
, 
cannot swing his right arm to counterbalance his stride.31 In addition to his shoulder pain and 
limitations, Mr. Marquez continues to suffer from additional pain and weakness in his wrist, 
hand, and forearm from the injuries to his lower arm.32 
It is Dr. Hassinger's opinion that Mr. Marquez's shoulder will not improve.33 Dr. Hassin-
ger rated Mr. Marquez's right shoulder impairment at 5% of the whole person and recommended 
permanent restrictions to avoid overhead activity with the right arm.34 Dr. Hassinger specifically 
recommended that Mr. Marquez not return to his time-of-injury job.35 
24 Tr. p. 61, 11. 11-25. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
25 Tr. p. 64, 11. 5-10. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
26 Tr. p. 59, 11. 5-15. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
27 Tr. p. 62, 11. 9. See also Hearing Exhibits 1-19 (medical records). 
28 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 34, 11. 1-4 and p. 36, 11. 8-22). 
29 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 34, 11. 2-11 and p. 35, 11. 2-25). 
30 Tr. p. 63, 11. 5-14. 
31 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 36, 11. 8-22). 
32 Tr. p. 60, 11. 2-22. 
33 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 19 (Marquez Deposition at p. 24, 11. 12-19). 
34 Claimant's Hearing Exhibit 5 at pp. 000072-000073. 
35 Id. 
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In July 2010, Mr. Marquez was referred to the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Di-
vision (IRCD) by the State Insurance Fund. IRCD consultant Ken Halcomb was assigned to the 
case.36 Mr. Holcomb interviewed Mr. Marquez about his education, past work history, and trans-
ferable skills.37 \Vhen it became evident that Mr. Marquez would not be able to return to his 
time-of-injury job, Mr. Halcomb assisted 11r. Marquez in identifying other potential employment 
opportunities more consistent ,vith his restrictions and within his geographic area.38 Eventually, 
Mr. Halcomb closed the file without placing Mr. Marquez with another employer.39 The labor 
market survey prepared by Mr. Halcomb at the time of closure suggested that Mr. Marquez 
would probably not be able to find employment that would replace his time-of-injury wage of 
$12.00 per hour with benefits including insurance, since most of the jobs identified by Mr. Hal-
comb were paid in a range of only $7.00 per hour to $9.00 per hour.40 
At no time prior to closure of the file did Mr. Halcomb learn that Mr. Marquez was an 
undocumented worker.41 In later testimony, Mr. Halcomb acknowledged that there is a labor 
market for undocumented workers in the Treasure Valley.42 
36 Tr. p. 22, 11. 15-16. See also Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6. 
37 Tr. p. 24, 11. 12-16. See also Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6. 
38 Tr. p 19, 11. 8-14. See also Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6. 
39 Defendants' Hearing Exhibit 6. 
40 Tr. p. 33, 11. 8-13; Tr. p. 56, 11. 1-3. 
41 Tr. p. 33, 11. 16-18. 
42 Tr. p. 36, 1. 36 top. 37, 1. 24. 
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III. Course of Proceedings 
On April 14, 2015, Mr. Marquez filed a Workers' Compensation Complaint.43 On May 1, 
2015, he filed an Amended Workers' Compensation Complaint.44 On May 14, 2015, Pierce 
Painting and the State Insurance Fund ( collectively "Surety") filed an Answer to the Amended 
Complaint.45 In the Answer to the Amended Complaint, the Surety admitted the occurrence of 
the accident, the existence of the employment relationship, and the fact that the parties were sub-
ject to the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
Following the filing of the Workers' Compensation Complaint, the Surety conceded that 
Mr. Marquez was a covered employee subject to the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act and ac-
cepted the claim notwithstanding his status as an undocumented worker. Based on this conces-
sion, the Surety paid Mr. Marquez's medical bills pursuant to LC. § 72-432, his total temporary 
disability pursuant to LC. § 72-408, and his permanent partial impairment pursuant to LC. § 72-
428. Despite having paid Mr. Marquez's medical bills, total temporary disability, and permanent 
partial impainnent, notwithstanding his status as an undocumented worker, the.Surety refused to 
pay any permanent disability benefits because of his status as an undocumented worker. 
Following a hearing by a referee, the Idaho Industrial Commission issued an Order on 
July 10, 2017, concluding that Mr. Marquez "is entitled to pursue a claim for pennanent disabil-
43R.pp.1-5. 
44 R. pp. 6-10. 
45 R. pp. 13-14. 
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ity without reference to his immigration status."46 On July 28, 2017, the Surety filed a Motion to 
Reconsider.47 On August 28, 2017, the Idaho Industrial Commission entered an Order, denying 
the Motion to Reconsider.48 
On August 29, 201 7, the Surety filed a Motion for Immediate Appeal, which was granted 
on September 21, 2017, by the Idaho Industrial Commission.49 On October 4, 2017, the Surety 
filed a Notice of Expedited Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 12.4.50 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The singular issue presented on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court is as follows: 
1. Whether the Idal10 Industrial Commission correctly determined that Mr. 
Marquez is entitled to pursue permanent disability benefits under the 
Idaho Worker's Compensation Act without reference to his immigration 
status. 
46 R. pp. 21-50. 
47 R. pp. 60-72. 
48 R. pp. 73-79. 
49 R. pp. 80-85. 
so R. pp. 86-90. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented on appeal concerns the construction of the Idaho Workers' Compen-
sation Act. With respect to the interpretation of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act, this 
Court has established the standard ofreview as follows: 
A constming court's primary duty is to give effect to the legislative intent 
and purpose underlying a statute. Moreover, the court must construe a statute as a 
whole, and consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine the 
intent of the legislature. It is incumbent upon the court to give the statute an inter-
pretation that will not deprive it of its potency. In construing a statute, not only 
must we examine the literal wording of the statute, but we also must study the 
statute in harmony with its objective. We also must take account of all other mat-
ters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy be-
hind the statute.· 
More specifically, we must liberally construe the provisions of the work-
ers' compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serve the humane 
purpose for which the law was promulgated. The purpose of the workers' com-
pensation law is to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their 
families and dependents. LC. § 72-201. 
Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336-37, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295-96 (1994) (inter-
nal citations omitted). 
"When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, this Court exercises free re-
view over the Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission's factual 
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Kelly v. Blue Ribbon Lin-
en Supply, Inc., 159 Idaho 324, 326-27, 360 P.3d 333, 335-36 (2015). See also I.C. § 72-732. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act unambiguously provides coverage and 
benefits to all Idaho employees without regard to immigration status. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission's Order holding that 1v1r. Marquez is entitled to pursue 
a claim for permanent disability without reference to his immigration status is in harmony with 
the express language of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act (IWCA) which provides coverage 
and benefits to all Idaho employees without regard to whether they are lawfully or unlawfully 
employed. 
IWCA's scope and definitional terms are drafted very broadly to include all employment 
and all employees without regard to the lavrfulness of the employment. Idaho Code § 72-203 
provides that the IWCA "shall apply to all public employment and to all private employment in-
cluding fann labor contracting not expressly exempt by the provisions of section 72-212." (Em-
phasis added). Idaho Code § 72-102(12) defines "employee" as "any person who has entered 
into the employment of, or who works under contract of service or apprenticeship with, an em-
ployer. It does not include any person engaged in any of the excepted employments enumerated 
in section 72-212." (Emphasis added). The language of LC. §§ 72-102(12), 72-203, and 72-212 
contain no exclusion or exemption based upon the lawfulness of employment. 
Specifically, with respect to private employment, the IWCA declares that the lawfulness 
of employment is irrelevant. Idaho Code § 72-204(2) provides: "The following shall constitute 
employees in private employment and their employers subject to the provisions of this law ... (2) 
A person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, in the service of an em-
13 
player under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied .... " (Emphasis added). 
This unambiguous definition of "employee" for purposes of the IWCA clearly expresses the Ida-
ho legislature's intent that IWCA coverage and benefits be available to all private employees 
without regard to the lawfulness of their employment. 
The Surety does not dispute that Mr. Marquez is covered by the IWCA and is entitled to 
at least some of its benefits without regard to the lawfulness of his employment as an undocu-
mented worker. In its Answer to the Amended Complaint, the Surety admitted that Mr. Marquez 
was subject to the IWCA.51 The Surety has further conceded that Mr. Marquez, as an undocu-
mented worker, is covered by the IWCA and entitled to its benefits by paying his medical bills 
under I.C. § 72-432, his total temporary disability under LC. § 72-408, and his permanent partial 
impaim1ent under LC. § 72-428. 
Although the Surety concedes that an undocumented worker is entitled to these particular 
IWCA benefits, the Surety nevertheless argues on appeal that an undocumented worker like Mr: 
Marquez is not entitled to permanent disability benefits under the IWCA. The Surety's argument 
should be rejected, because it contravenes the express language of I\VCA granting permanent 
disability benefits. 
Idalio Code § 72-423 provides that "pennanent disability" occurs "when the actual or 
presumed ability to engage in gainfitl activity is reduced or absent because of pem1anent impair-
ment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected." (Empha-
51 R. pp. 13-14. 
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sis added). Idaho Code § 72-425 provides: "Evaluation (rating) or permanent disability' is an ap-
praisal of the injured employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity 
as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical fac-
tors as provided in section 72-430, Idaho Code."52 (Emphasis added). "The central focus of [LC. 
§ 72-425] is on the 'ability to engage in gainful activity."' Page v. }.l[cCain Foods, Inc., 145 Ida-
ho 302,308, 179 P.3d 265,271 (2008) (quoting Smith v. Payette County, 105 Idaho 618,621, 
671 P.2d 1081, 1084 (1983)). 
With respect to permanent disability benefits, LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-425 broadly include 
any reduction in an employee's ability to engage in gainful activity without any limitation on that 
gainful activity with respect to the lawfulness of employment. Moreover, LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-
425 expressly apply to any Idaho "employee," which is defined by LC. § 72-204(2) as "any per-
son ... whether lawfully or unlawfully employed." Therefore, LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-425 unam-
biguously apply to all injured employees without regard to the lawfulness of the employment. 
From the language of LC. §§ 72-204(2), 72-423, and 72-425, it is apparent that the Idaho 
legislature intended for permanent disability benefits under the IWCA to be available to Idaho 
workers without regard to the lawfulness of employment. In other words, the Idaho legislature 
52 Similarly, LC. § 72-102(11) of the IWCA defines "disability" for purposes of determining to-
tal or partial disability income benefits as "a decrease in wage-earning capacity due to injury or 
occupational disease, as such capacity is affected by the medical factor of physical impairment, 
and by pertinent nonmedical factors as provided in section 72-430(1), Idaho Code." (Emphasis 
added). Just as LC. § 72-425 does not limit "gainful activity" to only lawful employment, LC. § 
72-102(11) does not limit "wage-earning capacity" to only lawful employment. 
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intended that undocumented workers receive all benefits available under the IWCA, including 
permanent disability benefits provided for in LC. §§ 72-423 and 72-425. 
Contrary to the Surety's argument on appeal, the language of LC. § 72-430(1) does not 
exclude or exempt an employee from permanent disability benefits based upon the lawfulness of 
the employment. Idaho Code§ 72-430(1) provides: 
(1) Matters to be considered. In determining percentages of permanent disabili-
ties, account shall be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfig-
urement if of a kind likely to limit the employee in procuring or holding employ-
ment, the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, the occupation of the employee, 
and his age at the time of accident causing the injury, or manifestation of the oc-
cupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished ability of the af-
flicted employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geo-
graphical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the 
employee, and other factors as the commission may deem relevant .... 
Just like all other statutes contained within the IWCA, LC. § 72-430(1) is devoid of any lan-
guage, express or implied, prohibiting an employee from receiving permanent disability benefits 
based upon the lawfulness of employment. 
In construing the consideration factors contained in LC. § 72-430(1), it must be remem-
bered that these factors are considered for the singular purpose of determining under LC. § 72-
425 whether clain1ant's capacity for "gainful activity" has been reduced because of the claim-
ant's injury. See Seese v. Ideal of Idaho, 110 Idaho 32, 34, 714 P.2d 1, 3 (1985) (The 
test ... is ... whether the physical impairment ... has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful em-
ployment."). Under LC. § 72-425, only "pertinent" factors in LC. § 72-430(1) are considered. 
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The factors in LC. § 72-430(1) are "pe1iinent" only if they are relevant to the claimant's capacity 
for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425. 
The first group of factors under LC. § 72-430(1) when determining an employee's ca-
pacity for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425, include (a) the nature of the physical disable-
ment, (b) disfigurement likely to limit the employee's ability to procure or hold employment, (c) 
the cumulative effect of multiple injuries, (d) the occupation of the employee, (e) the employee's 
age, and (f) any manifestation of the occupational disease. With respect to Mr. Marquez's cir-
cumstances, this first group of factors readily suggest that he would be entitled to permanent dis-
ability benefits. The Surety does not contend otherwise. This first group of factors does not in-
clude any reference to the lawfulness of employment. 
The second group of factors under LC. § 72-430(1) when dete1111ining an employee's ca-
pacity for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425, include "the diminished ability of the afflicted 
employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable geographical area considering 
all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee." With respect to this second group 
of factors, this Court has construed the tenn "open labor market within a reasonable geographic 
area" as "the market in which the claimant was living at the time of hearing." Davaz, 125 Idaho 
at 337,870 P.2d at 1296. See also Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,608,272 P.3d 577,580 
(2012). Mr. Marquez lives in Emmett, Idaho. Under LC. § 72-430(1), consideration would be 
given to Mr. Marquez's diminished ability to compete for employment in and around Emmett, 
Idaho. Despite his status as an undocumented worker, it is undisputed that he actively competed 
and obtained employment for nearly two decades in and around Emmett, Idaho. It is also undis-
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puted that Mr. Marquez's ability to compete in that same market has been diminished because of 
his injury. The Surety does not contend otherwise. This supports an award of pennanent disabil-
ity benefits to Mr. Marquez. 
The Surety focuses upon the third group of factors to be considered under LC. § 72-
430(1) determining an employee's capacity for "gainful activity" under LC. § 72-425, which in-
cludes "all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee." This Court has construed 
this third group of factors as including "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, 
training and usable skills." Kindred v. Amalgamted Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 291, 756 P.2d 
401, 408 (1988). This Court has never construed this third group of factors as including consid-
eration of an employee's immigration status or its effect upon the lawfulness of employment. 
Nor would such consideration be appropriate given the language in LC. § 72-204(2) expressly 
excluding consideration of the la-wfulness of employment. Any suggestion by the Surety that the 
lav.,fulness of employment should be considered under LC. § 72-430(1) is contrary to the express 
language of LC. § 72-204(2) and would in1properly make the "whether lawfully or unlawfully, 
employed" language in LC. § 72-204(2) superfluous. See Golub v. Kirk-Scott, Ltd., 157 Idaho 
966, 974, 342 P.3d 893, 901 (2015) ("Effect must be given to all the words of the statute if pos-
sible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant.") 
Again, there is no language in LC. § 72-430(1), or anywhere else in the IWCA, prohibit-
ing consideration of both lawful and unlawful employment- there is only the language of LC. § 
72-204(2) defining "employee" as any person employed in Idaho without regard to whether the 
person is "lawfully or unlawfully employed." Given the express legislative mandate of LC. § 72-
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204(2) and its application throughout the IWCA, the only reasonable interpretation is that the 
lawfulness of employment is never considered under the IWCA and that all IWCA benefits, in-
cluding permanent disability, are available to all Idaho workers whether lawfully or unlawfully 
employed. Given the unambiguous language of the IWCA, the Idaho legislature's intent in this 
respect is clear. 
Had the Idaho legislature intended to exclude consideration ofunlmvful employment with 
respect to permanent disability benefits, the legislature knows how to do so. Title 72 of the Idaho 
Code provides a perfect example. Title 72 includes not only the IWCA but also the Idaho Em-
ployment Security Act ("IESA"), I.C. § 72-1301 et. seq. 53 The IESA provides certain unem-
ployment benefits to certain unemployed workers. Under the IESA, the Idaho legislature ex-
pressly excluded unemployment benefits for undocumented workers. Idaho Code § 72-
1366(19)(a) of the IESA provides: "Benefits shall not be payable on the basis of services per-
formed by an alien unless the alien was lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time 
such services were perfonned or was permanently residing in the United States under color of 
law at the time the services were perfonned." Had the Idaho legislature intended to exclude un-
documented workers from coverage and benefits under the IWCA, the legislature would have 
simply included an express exclusion similar to the one it included in the IESA. No such exclu-
sion is found in the IWCA. 
53 The Idaho Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over workers' compensation benefits under 
the IWCA as well as the unemployment benefits under the IESA. Consequently, the Idaho Indus-
trial Commission is familiar with the requirements of both Acts. 
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The broadly inclusive language of the IWCA provides coverage and benefits, including 
permanent disability benefits, to all injured Idaho employees without consideration of the law-
fulness of employment. The IWCA contains no language excluding undocumented workers from 
its coverage and benefits, including permanent disability benefits. Any .other interpretation of the 
IWCA would contravene the well-established principle that "workers' compensation laws are 
liberally construed in favor of the employee [ whether lawfully or unlmvfully employed], in order 
to serve the humane purpose behind the law." Estate of Aikele v. City of Blaclifoot, 160 Idaho 
903, 908, 382 P.3d 352, 357 (2016). See also Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336-37, 870 P.2d at 1295-96; 
LC. § 72-204(2). 
II. Legislative history supports interpreting the IWCA as providing coverage and 
benefits to all Idaho employees without regard to immigration status. 
A. Legislative history surrounding the enactment of the IWCA reveals that 
immigration status is irrelevant for purposes of permanent disability 
benefits. 
Because undocumented workers are a significant contributor to Idaho's economy, the 
Idaho legislature has seen fit to provide coverage and benefits to undocumented workers. The 
legislative policy for the enactment of the IWCA is set forth in I.C. § 72-201. As stated therein, 
the principal upon which the entire IWCA rests is that "[t]he welfare of the state depends upon 
its industries and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers." I.C. § 72-201 (Emphasis add-
ed). It cannot be disputed that undocumented workers are "wageworkers" in the State of Idaho 
and that the "welfare" of undocumented workers is therefore paramount under the IWCA. 
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In 2012, it was estimated that there were approximately 8.1 million undocumented work-
ers in the United States comprising approximately 5.1 % of the nation's labor force. See Roos 
Foods v. Guardado, 152 A.3d 114, 120 n.31 (Del. 2016) (citing Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera 
Cohn, Pew Research Ctr. 's Hispanic Trends Project, Unauthorized Immigrant Total Rise in 7 
States, Fall in 14: Decline in Those From Mexico Fuels Most State Decreases, 29 tbl. A3 
(2014)(hereinafter "Pew Research")). 54 This same Pew Research indicated that Idaho's undocu-
mented worker population was one of the fastest growing in the nation and that, in 2012, there 
were approximately 35,000 undocumented workers in Idaho comprising approximately 4.6% of 
Idaho's labor market. See Pew Research at Table A3. It cannot be disputed that undocumented 
workers represent a significant portion of Idaho's total labor force. The Idaho Industrial Com-
mission has found that "illegal aliens comprise a significant fraction of the agricultural work-
force."55 The Surety has not challenged this factual finding by the Commission. As a significant 
portion of Idaho's labor market, undocumented workers play an equally significant role in the 
overall economy of the State ofidaho. 
Because of the impact upon the State's economy, it was sound public policy as stated in 
I.C. § 72-201 for the Idaho legislature to enact the IWCA with broadly inclusive language pro-
tecting the "welfare" of undocumented workers. Not only does I. C. § 72-201 express the legisla-
tive intent that the IWCA should be construed in a manner protecting the "welfare" of all work-
ers, including undocumented workers, it also expresses the legislative intent that the IWCA 
54 http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2014/11/2014-11-18 unauthorized-immig:ration.pdf. 
55 R. at p. 31 (Idaho Industrial Commission Order). 
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should be construed in a manner providing "sure and certain relief' for those workers and their 
families. LC. § 72-201. 
In this respect, it is important to remember how the enactment of the IWCA protected the 
welfare of all workers in the State. Prior to the enactment of the IWCA, the only legal recourse 
available to injured employees in the State of Idaho was to sue their employers in t01i which re-
quired consideration of the negligence of both the employer and the employee. With the enact-
ment of the IWCA, Idaho employees were provided injury benefits "regardless of questions of 
fault" but "to the exclusion of every other remedy." LC. § 72-201. In other words, the coverage 
and benefits of the IWCA came with a quid pro quo eliminating tort relief for injured employees. 
See Venters v. Sorrento Del., Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 251, 108 P.3d 392,398 (2005) ("[T]his liabil-
ity for payment of workers' compensation benefits comes with a quid pro quo, in the form 
of tort immunity."). As a quid pro quo exchange, it must be assumed that the Idaho legislature 
intended for the IWCA to be construed in a manner providing benefits to injured Idaho workers 
that are at least as valuable, albeit different, than those that had previously been available under 
common law tort principles. 
The tort remedies originally available to undocun1e11ted workers in Idaho were addressed 
by this Court in the case of Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 733 P.2d 1234 (1986). In that case, 
an undocumented agricultural worker brought a tort claim against his employer for the loss of his 
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hand in a potato harvester.56 The jury awarded $1,350,000 in damages. On appeal, the employer 
argued that evidence of the worker's status as an illegal alien should not have been excluded at 
trial. This Court rejected the employer's argument, because the effect that the worker's status as 
an illegal alien might have on his future wage loss as a result of deportation or otherwise was 
"merely speculative," particularly given that the worker had already been in the United States for 
more than six years at the time of trial. Id. at p. 624, 733 P.2d at 1249. This Court commented 
that "it is anomalous for [the _employer] to complain about [the undocumented worker] being 
compensated on the basis of the wages he was receiving" after the employer "accepted the bene-
fits of his labors as an illegal alien." Id. 
The judicial directive in the Sanchez case was clear. With respect to a tort claim filed by 
an injured undocumented worker against an employer, the injured worker was entitled to pursue 
future lost wages without regard to the injured worker's immigration status. Consequently, this 
Court held that it was appropriate calculate an undocumented worker's future wage loss based 
upon the wage rate that the worker had been receiving in the United States. Id. at p. 624, 733 
P.2d at 1249. 
Although tort remedies were eliminated by the IWCA, the Idaho legislature nevertheless 
drafted the IWCA to provide a benefit for probable future wage loss to injured workers in the 
fom1 of IWCA permanent disability benefits. See LC. § 72-425 ( defining the evaluation of per-
manent disability as being an "appraisal of the injured employee's present and probable future 
56 At the time of this case, agricultural workers were exempted from the IWCA. As discussed 
below, the IWCA was amended in 1996 to include agricultural workers. 
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ability to engage in gainful activity"). This was a critical component of the quid pro quo substitu-
tion of common law tort with IWCA benefits for Idaho employees. 
Just as immigration status was irrelevant to a future wage loss claim under common law 
tort, it is equally irrelevant to a permanent disability claim under the IWCA. It would be unrea-
sonable to constrne the IWCA any other way, particularly given the legislative and judicial man-
date that it be construed liberally to ensure sure and certain relief to all Idaho workers, including 
undocumented workers. See I.C. 72-201 ("The welfare of the state depends ... upon the welfare of 
its wageworkers ... sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents 
is hereby provided."); Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336-37, 870 P.2d at 1295-96 ("[W]e must liberally 
construe the provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to 
serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated."). 
B. Legislative history surrounding the 1996 repeal of the agricultural exemption 
from the IWCA further reveals that immigration status is irrelevant for 
purposes of permanent disability benefits. 
Prior to 1996, all agricultural employment in Idaho was exempted from the IWCA, al-
lowing agricultural employees to sue their employers in tort for work-related injuries. See pre-
1996 version of LC. § 72-212 at 1994 Idaho Session Laws ch. 293 § 14, p. 916.57 During the 
1996 legislative session, the Idaho legislature repealed this agricultural exemption. In so doing, 
the Idaho legislature held several hearings in January and February 1996, where the legislative 
57 Subsection (8) of the pre-1996 version of LC. § 72-212 provided: "None of the provisions of 
this law [IWCA] shall apply to the following employments ... Agricultural pursuits ... [which] 
shall include the raising or harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity ... [ and] shall 
include the loading and transporting ... of any agricultural or horticultural commodity .... " 
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committees heard from many groups with a special interest in undocumented workers, including 
the Migrant Farm Workers Law Unit of Idaho Legal Aid Services, the Idaho Migrant Counsel, 
the Idaho Farm Workers Association, the Dairymen's Association, the Idaho Hispanic Caucus, 
and the Mujeres Unidas de Idaho. From these hearings, it is clear that the Idaho legislature was 
fully aware that the repeal of the agricultural exemption would provide IWCA benefits to undoc-
umented agricultural workers. With this awareness, had it been the Idaho legislature's intention 
to exclude undocumented agricultural from IWCA, the Idaho legislature.would have simply in-
cluded an exemption for undocumented workers in its 1996 amendment of LC. § 72-712. The 
fact that the Idaho legislature did not include an exemption for undocumented workers in its 
1996 amendment, knowing full well that the 1996 amendment would result in IWCA benefits 
being provided to undocumented workers, is a clear expression of the legislature's intention that 
undocumented workers receive all benefits provided by the IWCA, including permanent disabil-
ity benefits. 
III. The IWCA's coverage of undocumented workers is not preempted by the federal 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. 
On appeal, the Surety is arguing that an award of permanent disability benefits under the 
IWCA is preempted by the federal Immigration Refonn and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 
which IRCA makes it unlawful for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers and for 
employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility. 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1324a 
& 1324c. In support of its argument, the Surety relies upon Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (hereinafter "Hoffman"), in which the United States Supreme Court 
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held that an undocumented worker was not entitled to "backpay" under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act as an optional remedy for his unlawful termination. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149-150. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has not yet considered whether the IRCA preempts the IWCA 
with respect to undocumented workers in Idaho. However, many jurisdictions that have directly 
considered this issue have uniformly held that the IRCA does not preempt disability benefits 
provided to undocumented workers under state workers' compensation laws notwithstanding the 
Hoffman decision. See Delaware Valley Field Services. v. Ramirez, l 05 A.3d 396 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 2012); Abel Verdon Const,·. v. Rivera, 348 S.W.3d 749 (Ky. 2011); Asylum Co. v. D.C. De-
partment of Employment Services, 10 A.3d 619 (D.C. 2010); Economy Packing Co. v. nlinois 
Workers' Compensation Commission, 901 N.E.2d 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Affordable Haus. 
Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006); Cont'! PET Techs. v. Palacias, 604 S.E.2d 
627 (Ct. App. Ga. 2004); Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998) .. 
There are numerous reasons for holding that the IRCA does not preempt permanent disa-
bility benefits provided to undocumented workers under state workers' compensation laws. 
First, the IRCA does not expressly preempt state laws providing disability benefits, in-
cluding pennanent disability benefits, to injured workers. See Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 631; Econ-
omy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 921; Affordable Haus. Found., Inc, 469 F.3d at 239. Rather, the 
IRCA contains an express preemption clause which provides that "[t]he provisions of this section 
preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions ... upon those who employ, or 
recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). Workers' 
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compensation benefits are not sanctions; they are designed to compensate an employee for work-
related injuries regardless of fault. Economy Packing, 90 l N .E.2d at 921. 
Second, although the IRCA addresses the hiring of undocumented aliens, nothing in the 
IRCA indicates that Congress sought to supersede state law providing workers' compensation 
benefits to injured employees, whether undocumented or otherwise. Asylum Co., l O A.3d at 631; 
Economy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. To the contrary, the IRCA's legislative history suggests 
that the statute was not intended "to undermine or diminish in any way labor protections in exist-
ing law." H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(1), at 58 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. 
Third, there is no conflict between the IRCA and providing permanent disability benefits 
to undocumented workers for work-related injuries. Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 631-33; Economy 
Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. An award of permanent disability benefits for a work-related injury 
is fundan1entally different than the backpay for an unlawful temunation as addressed in Hoffman. 
Permanent disability benefits under LC. § 72-425 for diminished present and future ability to en-
gage in gainful activity is a substitute remedy for common law tort, as opposed to backpay in 
Hoffinan which simply addresses a statutory violation of federal law. Also, unlike the backpay in 
Hoffman, permanent disability benefits are "not designed to make a worker whole for what he 
would have earned if he had not continued working for his employer during the disability peri-
od," but rather are wage loss benefits "predicated upon the loss of wager-earning capacity" with 
the purpose to compensate the injured worker for inability to earn a living at any job because of 
the work-related injury. Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 631-33. See also LC.§ 72-425 ("probable future 
ability to engage in gainful activity"). And, unlike the undocumented alien in Hoffman, an in-
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jured undocumented worker suffers a loss of earning capacity umelated to her violation of the 
IRCA. Economy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. 
Fourth, it is not illegal for an undocumented worker to seek or engage in unauthorized 
employment under the IRCA. This was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Arizo-
na v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) as follows: 
The legislative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress 
made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or 
engage in, unauthorized employment. A cmmnission established by Congress to 
study immigration policy and to make recommendations concluded these penal-
ties would be "unnecessary and unworkable." ... Proposals to make unauthorized 
work a criminal offense were debated and discussed during the long process of 
drafting IRCA. ... But Congress rejected them .... In the end, IRCA's framework 
reflects a considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens engaged in un-
authorized work- aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation 
because of their removable status - would be inconsistent with federal policy and 
objectives .... 
. . . The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is 
that Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on 
aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law 
to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose .... 
Id. at 405-06. Because it is not illegal for illegal aliens to seek or engage in unauthorized em-
ployment under the IRCA, an award of pennanent disability benefits to an undocumented worker 
does not conflict with the IRCA or its purposes. 
Fifth, providing permanent disability benefits to an undocumented worker does not con-
travene the primary purpose of the IRCA to reduce illegal entry into the United States. Economy 
Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 923. The eligibility for workers' compensation benefits in the event of a 
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work-related accident cannot "reasonably be described as an incentive for undocumented aliens 
to unlawfully enter the United States." Economy Packing, 901 N.E.2d at 922. See also Abel Ver-
don Const!'., 348 S.W.3d at 755; Asylum Co., 10 A.3d at 633. 
Sixth, refusing to provide workers' compensation benefits, including permanent disabil-
ity, to undocumented workers would contravene the purpose of the IRCA "by providing a finan-
cial incentive for unscrupulous employers to hire unauthorized workers and engage in unsafe 
practices, leaving the burden of caring for injured workers and their dependents to the residents 
of the [state]." Abel Verdon Constr., 348 S.W.3d at 755. "[D]enying compensation coverage to 
undocumented aliens creates powerful incentives for employers to hire such individuals." Asylum 
Co., 10 A.3 d at 619 ( citation omitted). "To refuse to allow recovery against a person responsible 
for an illegal alien's employment who knew or should have known of the illegal alien's status 
would provide an incentive for such persons to target illegal aliens for employment in the most 
dangerous jobs or to provide illegal aliens with substandard working conditions." Affordable 
Haus. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d at 248 (quoting Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 
A.2d 994, 1000 (N.H. 2005)). 
Seventh, the Surety's reliance in this appeal on the case of Cherokee Indust,·ies, Inc. v. 
Alvarez, 84 P.3d 798 (Okla. Civ. Ct. App. 2003) is misplaced. 58 The issue before the Corni is 
whether Mr. Marquez is entitled to pursue pennanent disability under the IWCA. Cherokee In-
dustries does not address permanent disability and provides no authority with respect to the ap-
58 See Appellants' Brief at pp. 22-23. 
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propriateness of permanent disability benefits. Cherokee Industries only addresses temporary 
total disability benefits (TTD) and whether TTD benefits are precluded by the IRCA. The appro-
priateness of TTD is not presently before this Court given that the Surety has already paid TTD 
benefits to :Mr. Marquez. 
Eighth, the Surety's reliance in this appeal on the case of Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co., 
327 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2014) is also misplaced.59 The Salas case was not a workers' compensation 
case and therefore has no application to the issue before this Court. In Salas, an undocumented 
worker sued his employer for unlawful termination and sought relief under the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act. The circumstances were uncannily similar to those in Hoffman. 
Not surprisingly the California Supreme Court held that the undocumented worker's claim for 
lost wages during the post-discovery period was preempted by the IRCA. Id. at 807. However, 
the California Supreme Court held that the undocumented worker's claim for lost wages during 
the pre-discovery period was not pre-empted by the IRCA. Id. at 807-08. 
For these reasons which have been addressed in the above-referenced authority, the 
IRCA does not preempt pennanent disability benefits provided to undocumented workers under 
state workers' compensation laws. In other words, the IRCA does not preclude :Mr. Marquez 
from seeking permanent disability benefits under the IWCA. 
59 See Appellants' Brief at p. 23. 
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IV. The Surety's argument on appeal must be rejected because it is based upon the 
fiction that undocumented workers are unable to engage in gainful activity in an 
open labor market in Idaho. 
The Surety's argument on appeal must be rejected, because the argument is dependent 
upon the Surety's oft-repeated and fictitious contention that Mr. Marquez, as an undocumented 
worker, does not have access to a labor market. As discussed above, there are approximately 
35,000 illegal aliens working in Idaho. These 35,000 undocumented workers are clearly engaged 
in gainful activities in Idaho. These undocumented workers represent a significant portion of 
Idaho's total labor force and economy. This is the reality in Idaho. The IRCD consultant Mr. 
Halcomb admitted as much when he testified at the hearing that there was a labor market for un-
documented workers in the Treasure Valley.60 Idaho Code § 72-425 requires that permanent dis-
ability be determined by appraising an injured employee's "present and probable future ability to 
engage in gainful activity." This statute requires that an injured employee's ability to engage in 
gainful activity be assessed based upon truthful facts and not based upon a fiction. Therefore, the 
Suretf s fictitious contention that no labor market exists for undocumented workers must be re-
jected. Likewise, the Surety's argument that undocumented workers are not entitled to permanent 
disability must also be rejected. 
Lastly, the Surety's oft-repeated suggestion that the Idaho Industrial Commission's Order 
"created" a system for providing permanent disability benefits to undocumented workers where 
none had previously existed must also be rejected. It was not the Industrial Comm1ssion's Order 
60 Tr. p. 36, 1. 36 top. 37, 1. 24. 
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that "created" benefits for undocumented workers - it was the Idaho legislature who "created" 
those benefits when it enacted the IWCA in 1917 for basically all Idaho workers and expanded 
those benefits to agricultural workers in 1996. Just because the Industrial Commission did not 
award permanent disability benefits to undocumented workers from 2009 through 2017 does not 
mean that undocumented workers were not entitled to permanent disability benefits under the 
IWCA during that time period. The Idaho Industrial Commission did not stop awarding penna-
nent disability benefits to undocumented workers until its decision in 2009 in Jesus Diaz v. 
Franklin Building Supply, LC. 2006-507999 (Idaho Ind. Com. Nov. 20, 2009). 
Note should be taken of this Court's decision in Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 
Idaho 309,336 P.3d 242 (2014). In Serrano, this Corui affinned the denial of permanent disabil-
ity benefits to an injured undocumented worker based exclusively upon a lack of causation evi-
dence. Because the undocumented worker failed to satisfy his burden of proof, the Court did not 
have an opportunity in Serrano to address the appropriateness of permanent disability benefits 
for undocumented workers. Nevertheless, Justice Jones penned a concurrence in Serrano joined 
by Justice Burdick that quoted the entirety of a dissent from the prior Industrial Commission's 
decision of Diaz, which argued that undocumented workers should be entitled to pem1anent dis-
ability benefits under the IWCA. The Industrial Commission's Order at issue in the present case 
tracks the analysis contained in the dissent in Diaz quoted in the concurrence in Serrano. Nota-
bly, the Industrial Commissioner that drafted the dissent in Diaz in 2009 is the same C01runis-
sioner that drafted the majority opinion in the Idaho Industrial Commission's Order in 2017 that 
is now before this Court on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully requested that the Idaho Supreme Court 
hold that undocumented workers, like Mr. Marquez, are entitled to pursue permanent disability 
benefits under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act without to immigration status. 
DATED this 16th day of January 2018. 
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